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I. Global Migration and Cultural Theory 
One of the most striking developments in contemporary cultural theory 
is the rise of three key concepts that respond to the increased pressure put 
on nationality as a unit of cultural analysis. This paper will attempt to 
show that a new awareness of China as a supra-national entity indeed 
serves as an important, indeed indispensable, context for the rise of these 
three concepts- transnationalism, cosmopolitanism, and diaspora. Chinese 
forms of globality are especially a major focus among U.S.-based, 
diasporic Chinese intellectuals who have been playing a key role in the 
"gradual episternic shift that seeks to modify the claim of a 
homogeneously unified, univocal China" and establish the theoretical 
basis for speaking of "Chineseness in the plural."l) 
The following statement by Anthony King serves as a useful 
introduction to the broader context for the rise of these three concepts: 
:-}esearch for this essay was supported by a 2006 grant from the Institute of Humanities 
h)
t Seoul National University. 
I ey Chow, "Introduction," Modem Chinese Literary and Cultural Studies in the Age 
o Theory: Reimagining a Field (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), 6, 18 . 
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TIle shortcomings of any academic paradigm, be it sociology or cultural 
studies, conceived on the basis of a "national society," can be illustrated 
by two examples. With a potentially exponential growth in international 
migration, with many cultures existing far from their places of origin and 
indeed, not necessarily for any length of time (vide migrants from 
Kuwait, South Africa, the Soviet Union), there is no "nationally ground-
ed" theoretical paradigm which can adequately handle the epistemological 
situation. It is not just that, increasingly, many people have no roots; it ' s 
also that they have no soil. Culture is increasingly detemtorialized. 
In the second place, a knowledge paradigm based primarily on a na-
tionally organized society, or at least, without a larger transnational 
frame, can also not cope with cultural phenomena which, while clearly 
related to those of that society, nonetheless circulate in, outside and 
around it, in the case of the UK, in the USA, India, Nigeria, South 
Africa, Australia, Hong Kong and elsewhere in the "English speaking" 
ecumene' The rapidly expanding post-colonial discourse in English, 
though itself posing distinctive problems in regard to its origins and loca-
tion of both theoretical and political reference, is ample illustration.2) 
King notes that the sheer volume of international migration has 
created an epistemological crisis over an object of knowledge that is no 
longer stable, but rather porous and mobile. The link between culture 
and nation has come increasingly under stress as people, the carriers of 
culture, literally move beyond the nation. According to Hania Zlotnik, 
the total migrant stock grew from 75 million persons in 1965 to 120 
million in 1990, leaving "no country untouched. "3) Thus, while it 
2) Anthony King, "Introduction: Spaces of Culture, Spaces of Knowledge," Culture, 
Globalization and the World-System: Contemporary Conditions for the Representation 
of Identity (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 6. 
3) Hania Zlotnik, "International Migration, 1965-96: An Overview," Population and 
Development Review 24 (1998), 432, 434. 
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remains true that international migration takes place in a world that is 
still "organized into mutually exclusive and legally sovereign states that 
impose barriers to international mobility in general and to international 
migration in particular,"4) these barriers are being eroded and 
surmounted in ever more diverse ways. As King puts it, people and 
culture are becoming increasingly "deterritorialized." King's second 
point is that national culture, whatever that may involve, cannot be 
understood properly without also taking into consideration the "larger 
transnational frame" in which it operates. To illustrate his point, he 
points out that British culture today cannot be understood apart from its 
colonial history or its postcolonial counterparts (i.e. the history of the 
USA, India, Nigeria, South Afria, Australia, and Hong Kong, for 
instance). 
Although King refers to postcolonial ism as an "ample illustration" of 
a transnational cultural theory that can correct the national bias in 
socio-cultural theory, it is arguably the inadequacy of postcolonial ism as 
a theory about global culture that has motivated a new generation of 
scholars to turn to China as a new focal point for cultural analysis. In 
Aihwa Ong's view, the main problem with postcolonialism as a theory 
of globalization is that postcolonial ism is by in large a bipolar study of 
the domination of the non-west by the west in the beginning epochs of 
global capital, and as such is in many respects simply outdated. 
Building on the "particular experiences of colonialism in India as the 
model for understanding contemporary relations of domination, 
subjugation, and subjectivization," postcolonial ism centers on "relations 
4) Zlotnik, 430. Zlotnik refers to Aristide R. Zolbert's article " International Migrations in 
Political Perspective" in Global Trends in Migration : Theory and Research on 
International Population Movements, ed. Mary M. Kritz, Charles B. Keely, and Silvano 
M. Tomasi (Staten Island, NY: Center for Migration Studies, 1981), 3-27. 
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of domination, subjugation, and subjectivization" III powerful ways. 
When extended into an encompassing "metropolitan theory of third-
world subalternity," however, it "tends to collapse all non-Western 
countries (except Japan, of course) into the same model of analysis."5) 
The significance of China-based theories of globality lies, in Ong's 
view, in that they foreground the important fact that we are now living 
"in a world where capitalism is no longer entered in the West but 
distributed across a number of global arenas" where the old 
core-periphery economic model simply no longer holds true. 6) 
China is where the postcolonial paradigm fails: "China in particular 
cannot fit into conventional notions about postcolonial societies because 
it was never fully colonized, nor as a major socialist state does it engage 
the global economy in quite the same way as smaller developing 
countries."7) Chinese transnational migration does not fit the general 
pattern of "diverse labor supplies flowing toward an advanced capitalist 
formation. "8) And the Chinese diasporic subject fails to conform to the 
American model of the diasporic subject who, like the postcolonial 
subject, tends to be seen as "oppressed," "constitutionally opposed to 
capitalism and state power," and therefore potentially a model ethical 
subject.9) On this latter leap of faith Ong is especially critical. 
The challenge, then, is to come up with cultural theories of 
globalization that take into account the specific cultural forms and 
meanings of Chinese transnational migration that can interrogate the 
5) Aihwa Ong, Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1999), 32. 
6) Ibid., 31 . 
7) Ibid., 36. 
8) Ibid., 8. 
9) Ibid., 13. 
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shortcomings of existing cultural paradigms. In what follows, I shall 
attempt to show how contemporary theorists of the Chinese diaspora, 
Chinese transnationalism, and Chinese cosmopolitanism have attempted 
to correct crucial u.s. biases in migration studies and diaspora studies, 
as well as resist the growing call for a uniform China based on the 
Chinese nation state. 
II. The New Chinese Diasporas 
Laurence Ma writes that "Historic international migration was 
characterized by permanent, unidirectional, and onetime movement of 
people from one country to another often under economic, religious, or 
political duress at the places of origin,"IO) but that modem Chinese 
migration fails to conform to this model of migration in significant ways. 
The traditional migrants of the old Chinese diaspora were usually laborers 
or traders, mostly originating from five regions in Orina, who traveled via 
Hong Kong either to Southeast Asia or to the Americas. I I) Most of these 
migrants left China due to economic distress, with the intention of 
returning home. Those who stayed in their new abodes tended to live in 
segregated communities, often "Chinatowns," in which they replicated old 
10) Laurence J. C. Ma, "Space, Place, and Transnationalism in the Chinese Diaspora," in 
The Chinese Diaspora: Space, Place, Mobility, and Identity, ed. Laurence J. C. Ma and 
Carolyn Cartier (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), I. For a synopsis of the four 
major schools of thOUght that provide causal explanations for international migration, 
see Ma, 3. 
II) According to Ma, traditional migrants belonged to the following five groups: Cantonese 
from Canton, Hokkien from souther Fujian, Teochiu from Chaozhou and Shantou in 
Guangdong, Hainanese from Hainan Island, and Hakka from the hills of northern 
Guangdong and southern Fujian. See Ma, 20. 
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Chinese social structures. As of 1963, the global total of Chinese overseas 
was 12.7 million; in 1997 the global total was 32.8 million.12) In sheer 
volwne, the post-1970s Chinese diasporas are markedly different from the 
old. The new Chinese migrants come from much more varied 
socioeconomic backgrounds, they travel for reasons other than economic 
duress, and their relationship to China is much more open. As Ma puts it, 
"The Chinese mainland is no longer the sole homeland of the Chinese 
abroad"; "Contemporary diasporic actors are also more footloose, less 
fixed in space and elusive in place attachment."13) They are willing to 
move multiple times and tend to be less attached to the original Chinese 
overseas settlements. They are often highly successful entrepreneurs and 
capitalists, many of them owners of family-based, small-scale 
multinational firms. And their cultural identity tends to be cosmopolitan 
and open to change. Often carriers of dual or multiple passports, they 
regard citizenship as a "flexible," strategic, and instrwnental means to 
procure living environments, economic choices, and political 
arrangements that better suit them.14) Many of them can indeed be 
characterized as "voluntary political risk minimizers running away from 
a topophobia of a place of origin in the Chinese diaspora."15) 
On the other hand, there also exists the counter cultural movement of 
overseas Chinese seeking to renew their ties to the homeland-what 
Benedict Anderson in his essay "Exodus" memorably calls "long-
distance nationalism." I 6) After many years of being forced to efface 
12) Ibid., 19. 
13) Ibid., 19. 
14) "Flexible citizenship" is a tenn coined by Aihwa Ong in her well-known book Flexible 
Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality (1999). A separate section of the 
paper will be devoted to this book. 
15) Ma, 34. 
16) Benedict Anderson, "Exodus," Critical Inquiry 20 (1994), 326. 
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their Chineseness due to postcolonial policies, fear of communism and 
jealousy of successful business, many Chinese are renewing their 
cultural ties with their homeland. 17) As China 's prestige as a world 
power rises, this tendency is likely to become more marked. Arif Dirlik 
warns: 
The discourse on the Chinese diaspora needs to be understood in its 
own specific field of associations, which includes discourses on the 
Pacific, Greater China, Confucianism, Asian values, etc., the appearance 
of which coincided temporally with the appearance of diaspora discourse. 
The cumulative effect of these discourses has been a 're-sinicization,' at 
least at the ideological level, of diverse Chinese populations, by empha-
sizing the common ' Chineseness' of these populations, and the global 
power that might be theirs if they are united around this common 
'Chineseness.' 18) 
Anderson's point was that the seeming supra-national "ideological 
program of multiculturalism" has had the paradoxical effect of 
ethnicizing politics and of creating "transnational ethnicity" that can fuel 
long-distance participation in national politics that is "radically 
unaccountable."19) Here, Dirlik notes that diaspora discourse, too, with 
its overemphasis on "ethnicity and culture," can actually serve as a 
mystification of existing, including national, hegemonies by 
"privatizing" cultural identity rather than politicizing it.20) Both 
Anderson and Dirlik support Khachig Toloyan's remark that "To affinn 
17) Ma. 37. 
18) Arif Dirlik. "Intimate Others: [Private) Nations and Oiasporas in an Age of 
Globalization." Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 5 (2004). 498. 
19) Anderson. 325. 327. 
20) Dirlik. 296. 
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that diasporas are the exemplary communities of the transnational 
moment is not to write the premature obituary of the nation-state which 
remains a privileged form of polity."21) Thus, while "Diasporas are 
emblems of transnationalism because they embody the question of 
borders, which is at the heart of any adequate definition of the Others 
of the nation-state,"22) they exist "neither in necessary opposition to 
their homelands' nationalism nor in a servile relationship to them."23) 
What is certain is that the new Chinese diasporas complicate the 
traditional associations of diaspora with "traditions of forced exile, 
communal suffering, tenacious identity, and longing for the homeland" 
that give the concept its "moral flavor. "24) At the same time, the new 
Chinese diasporas also retain a distance from the celebratory notion of 
diaspora as sheer diversity, "multiplicity, fluidity, wildness, hybridity."25) 
Located in between these two notions of "diaspora-as-exile" and 
"diaspora-as-diversity," between the ancient Jewish diaspora and the 
multicultural diasporas of contemporary America, the new Chinese 
diasporas are economically aggressive and politically ambiguous.26) For 
this reason, the primary difference between discussions of Chinese 
transnationalism and Chinese diasporas tends to depend on whether 
economic mobility or political identity (in terms of national politics) is 
selected as the most important factor for analysis. 
21) Khachig Toloyan, "The Nation-State and Its Others: In Lieu of a Preface," Diaspora 1 
(1991): 5. 
22) Toloyan, "The Nation-State and Its Others," 6. 
23) Toloyan, "Rethinking Diaspora(s): Stateless Power in the Transnational Moment," 
Diaspora 5 (1996), 7. 
24) Adam McKeown, "Conceptualizing Chinese Diasporas, 1842 to 1949," The Journal of 
Asian Studies 58 (1999), 308. 
25) Ibid., 308. 
26) Ibid., 311. 
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ill. Chinese Transnationalism and "Flexible Citizenship" 
It is surely not surprising that the most vigorous theorizations of 
transnational, diasporic Chinese identity have emerged from intellectual 
members of the Chinese diaspora, especially those based in the u.s. 
academy where citizenship, cultural identity, and ethnic politics have 
historically remained at the center of national debate. Arguing that the 
American university has become a site of active intervention in diaspora 
discourse, Toloyan notes that the university is "the site where national 
and transnational multiculturalism meet, not just as texts and curricula 
but in the form of bodies." In other words, "the American university and 
the education 'industry' have been comparatively successful in bringing 
together ethnic, racial and potentially diasporan elites" who often 
engage in knowledge production centered on their own transnational 
identities.27) Armed with poststructuralist theories of subjectivity, 
influenced by the derailing of "earlier prevailing assumptions about the 
linear and inevitable nature of assimilation" and the "consequent 
persistence of ethnicity," these diasporic scholars are a central motor for 
the theorization of transnational ism and diaspora.28) 
Aihwa Ong, who was born into a Straits Chinese family in Penang, 
Malaysia, and is currently professor of anthopology at UC Berkeley, is 
exemplary in this regard.29) In her 1998 article "Flexible Citizenship 
among Chinese Cosmopolitans" and 1999 book Flexible Citizenship: 
27) T616yan, "Rethinking Diaspora(s)," 26-27. 
28) Ibid., 27. 
29) In Flexible Citizenship, Ong writes: "As a huaqiao (overseas Chinese), or a Straits 
Chinese born in Malaysia, my ideas about China were a mix of grim images of poverty 
and state oppression on the one hand, and a kinder, gentler Chinese people (than those 
in diaspora) on the other." (42) 
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The Cultural Logics of Transnationality, Ong focused on a "diasporic 
Chinese modernity . . . developed among emigrant Chinese in the 
colonial worlds of East and Southeast Asia," turning their economic, 
political and cultural practices into utterly central examples of 
contemporary transnationality.30) In brief, Ong characterizes the 
transnational practices of this group of overseas Chinese as resistant to 
national, state-sponsored culture, deeply strategic and pragmatic, 
aggressively capitalistic, disciplinary and patriarchal in familial practice, 
flexible in choice of political citizenship. Ong is especially interested and 
invested in the merchant class of overseas Chinese who, in the "city ports 
and colonial enclaves" of East and Southeast Asia, "facing political 
mistreatment and intense competition for survival evolved an 
instrumentality in norms concerning labor organization, family practice, 
links between family and the wider economy, and dealing with political 
authorities."31) She writes: "Huaqiao communities have provided the 
signs, forms, and practices of a distinctive modernity that learns from 
the West but transforms capitalism into a Chinese phenomenon."32) 
It is well known that the overseas Chinese have long depended on 
guanxi networks based on "paternal bonds and interpersonal relations" 
to secure "networks for interregional trade."33) Ong points out that these 
30) Ong, "Flexible Citizenship among Chinese Cosmopolitans," Cosmopolitics: Thinking 
and Feeling beyond the Nation, ed. Pheng Cheah and Bruce Robbins (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 137. 
31) Ong, Flexible Citizenship, 114. Ong cites the anthropologist Fei Hsia-tung, a diasporic 
Chinese trained in London, who attacked this class of overseas Chinese known as 
"compradors": "half-cast in culture, bilingual in speech, morally unstable," inhabitants 
of pons "where the acquisition of wealth is the sole motive, devoid of tradition and 
culture." Fei Hsia-tung, "Peasant and Gentry: An Interpretation of Chinese Social 
Structure and Its Changes," Class, Status, and Power, ed. E. Bendix and S. M. Lipset 
(New York: Free Press, 1953), 646-47. Cited in Ong, 114-15. 
32) Ibid., 52. 
33) Ibid., 115. 
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guarzxi networks were part of "a kind of (post)colonial habitus" 
responding to "the discipline of the colonial (and later, the postcolonial) 
states, with their special regimes of othering Chineseness." In other 
words, in the course of building their overseas communities, the migrant 
Chinese relied on guanxi as "a historically evolved regime of kinship 
and ethnic power" in order to escape state prosecution and cultural 
othering,34) In order to build their businesses in nation states that 
discouraged overt allegiances to Chineseness, whether political or 
cultural, the overseas Chinese in postcolonial Asian states had to 
downplay their ethnic identity with regard to national politics. Within 
their own communities, however, they practised an often authoritarian 
and "utilitarian familialism" that subordinated family life to business 
interests and downplayed the significance of political citizenship,35) This 
tendency to downplay citizenship and political participation while 
emphasizing familial bonds in the service of business practices thus has 
its roots in (post)colonial state discipline. It is a tendency that is 
growing even more marked today as Chinese capitalism takes off with 
greater speed and success. 
Ong notes that, whereas "Earlier Chinese immigrants to the United 
States were largely laborers, with a sprinkling of merchants," the newer 
Chinese immigrants to the U.S. and other western countries are often 
"investors and professionals" who "arrive as cosmopolitans already wise 
in the ways of Western business and economic liberalism."36) This class 
of "Chinese corporate elites," Ong argues, is revising the dominant 
34) Ibid., 116. 
35) Ong notes that the term "utilitarian familialism" is used by Hong Kong scientists "to 
describe the everyday norms and practices whereby Hong Kong families place family 
interests above all other individual and social concerns." See Ibid., 118. 
36) Ibid., 127. 
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image of Chinese migrants as "migrant workers, boat people," "money 
handlers, trading minorities, and middle-men,"3?) and proving that, more 
than ever before, "cultural difference racial hierarchy, and citizenship" 
can be actively manipulated by those who have the "material and 
symbolic resources" to select their sites of political and economic 
abode,38) For this class of capitalist migrants, citizenship is a paper 
affair, subject to constant revision, abundantly and essentially "flexible." 
Ong thus uses the term "flexible citizenship" "to refer especially to the 
strategies and effects of mobile managers, technocrats, and professionals 
seeking to both circumvent and benefit from different nation-state 
regimes by selecting different sites for investments, work, and family 
relocation. "39) 
What is especially striking about Ong's theory is the extent to which 
flexible citizenship bypasses and subverts traditional west-east, 
core-periphery, modernity-tradition binaries in cultural theory.40) Unlike 
the subaltern Indian who is the symbolic figure for postcolonial cultural 
theory, the transnational Chinese is a figure of a mobile (post) 
modernity or post-postcoloniality, a figure of pragmatic adaptation 
rather than resistance, one who is attached neither to west nor west in 
incontrovertible ways, less a victim than a challenger, to use Robin 
Cohen's terms.41 ) Adept at capitalist accumulation, faithful neither to 
the postcolonial nor the "home" nation state, opportunistic and 
inventive, and fundamentally de territorialized, these new Chinese 
37) Ong, "Flexible Citizenship among Chinese Cosmopolitans," 156. 
38) Ong, Flexible Citizenship, 112. 
39) Ibid., 112. 
40) Ibid., 135-36. 
41) See Robin Cohen, "Diasporas and the Nation-State: From Victims to Challengers," 
International Affairs 72.3 (1996): 507-20. 
Transnationalism, Cosmopolitanism, Diaspora 219 
migrants have invented "overly flexible" models of split-family, 
bi-coastal living, with "astronaut wives" raising children in the 
American suburbs while the husband shuffles between Hong Kong and 
the U.S., or "parachute kids" who are "dropped off in California by 
their Hong Kong and Taiwan parents."42) This is a form of 
contemporary transnational ism that surely has its personal and political 
costs. Ong notes that it is neither essentially liberatory nor liberal in 
actual practice since it often involves "premodern forms of children, 
gender, and class oppression" and is linked to "strengthened 
authoritarian regimes in Asia."43) It can also be self-promoting and 
self-deluding at the same time. For instance, Ong points to the ways in 
which transnational Chinese migrants tend to be "cocreators in 
orientalism." Ong accuses "Diasporan-Chinese academics" in particular 
for using orientalist discourse to authorize "'an Oriental alternative' to 
the destructive instrumental rationality and individualism of the West" or 
to tum overseas Chinese on the periphery into a new center for 
"Chineseness."44) What Ong is finally suggesting, then, is that Chinese 
diasporic communities may indeed be the exemplary "communities of our 
transnational moment" (to use T6l6yan's formulation)-a moment 
characterized, in Ong's formulation, above all by flexible citizenship. It 
is not so much, she says, that there is "anything uniquely 'Chinese' 
about flexible personal discipline, disposition, and orientation." Rather, 
it is that the transnational Chinese, perhaps more than any other group, 
express "a habitus that is finely tuned to the turbulence of late 
42) Ong, Flexible Citizenship, 128. 
43) Ibid., 135. 
44) Ong is here criticizing such works as Tu Hung-chao's Confucianism and Economic 
Development: An Oriental Alternative? (1989) and Tu Wei-ming's The Living Tree: 
The Changing Meaning of Being Chinese Today (1994) . 
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capitalism."45) Following Ong, we would have to take Chinese 
transnational ism as paradigmatic of our transnational moment, though 
what makes Chinese transnational ism particularly "Chinese" remains 
fundamentally open to question. 
IV. Chinese Cosmopolitanism and the limits 
of the Chinese Diaspora 
As we have seen, Ong's theory of Chinese "flexible citizenship" is 
already, in a sense, a critique of the notion of a stable Chinese diaspora 
understood as a displaced but cohesive community. It is clear that Ong 
is critical of the potential cultural centralism embedded in the discourse 
on Chinese diasporas, and mindful of oppressive strategies connected to 
the flexibility and mobility of Chinese transnational migrants. Yet in her 
emphasis on the connection between transnational ism and capitalism, 
Ong ultimately gives surprisingly short shrift to migrants who are poorer 
and to those who are more committed to political engagement.46) To put 
it differently, in her overemphasis on dominant forms of economic 
transnationalism, she neglects alternative forms of what has been 
theorized recently as "minor transnationalism"-i.e. not the 
"transnationalism of the multinational corporate sector, of fmance 
capital, of global media, and other elite-controlled macrostructural 
45) Ong, Flexible Citizenship, 136. 
46) In his review of Ong's book, Adam McKeown notes that Ong "devotes almost no atten-
tion to the poorer strate of Chinese migrants." He adds, "Surely, smuggling rings and 
cheap labor in the garment and food industries are inseparable from the economic suc-
cess and hegemonic discourses discussed in this book." See his review in The Journal 
of Asian Studies 59 (2000): 980-82. 
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processes" that tends to "celebrate the overcoming of national and other 
boundaries for the constitution of a liberal global market," but rather the 
"'transnationalism from below,' which is the sum of the counter-
hegemonic operations of the nonelite."47) In this final section, I will 
point to two significant theorizations of the Chinese diaspora that are 
much more invested in active cultural and political resistance on the part 
of Chinese diasporans. 
My first example is the work of len Ang who describes herself as 
having been "born in postcolonial Indonesia into a middle-class, 
peranakan Chinese family." She explains this term thus: "The 
peranakans are people of Chinese descent who are born and bred in 
South East Asia, in contrast to the totok Chinese, who arrived from 
China much later and generally had much closer personal and cultural 
ties with the ancestral homeland."48) The peranakan Chinese, unlike the 
totok Chinese, settled very early in Southeast Asia as traders and 
craftsmen, even before the arrival of the Europeans and colonialism, and 
tended to lose their cultural connections to mainland China. Ang notes 
that most peranakans in fact forgot the Chinese language and spoke 
their version of Malay. Even so, they were SUbjected to strict forms of 
political surveillance and control by European colonial policies that 
distinguished them from both Europeans and the indigenous natives and 
ironically strengthened their identification with their original 
"homeland." In the case of Indonesia, which was conquered by the 
Dutch, the peranakans were forced to live in segregated communities 
47) Franyoise Lionnet and Shu-mei Shih, "Thinking through the Minor, Transnationally," 
Minor Transnationalism (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 6. 
48) len Ang, "On Not Speaking Chinese: Diasporic Identifications and Postmodem 
Ethnicity," On Not Speaking Chinese: Living between Asia and the West (London: 
Routledge, 2001), 26. 
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with strict pass and zoning laws. Nonetheless, the peranakans responded 
less enthusiastically to the calls to resinification than the totoks and 
earned their resentment.49) 
In her experience growing up as a peranakan with multiple allegiances 
to Indonesian, Dutch, and Chinese culture, Ang writes, "Chineseness . . 
. was an imposed identity" and one that she very much wanted to "get 
rid of."50) It was, however, an identity that followed her from Indonesia 
to the Netherlands when her family emigrated there in the 1960s, and 
one that persisted during the two decades of her "Dutchification."51) 
Now a professor of cultural studies at the University of Western Sydney 
in Australia, she remains committed to resisting what she calls a 
"postmodern ethnicity [that] can no longer be experienced as naturally 
based upon tradition and ancestry."52) To speak of the Chinese diaspora, 
in other words, is to risk enormous generalizations that can belie "the 
irreducible specificity of diverse and heterogeneous hybridizations in 
dispersed temporal and spatial contexts." In other words, "the unevenly 
scattered imagined community of the diaspora cannot be envisioned in 
any unified or homogeneous way."53) Her important point is that 
Chinese diasporic identity can be imposed oppressively from the outside 
as well as voluntarily "self-orientalizing"-in other words, alternately 
complicitous with western definitions of the non-west as ineluctably 
ethnicized or the Chinese tendency to engage in "epic" self-obsession. 54) 
The way out of this double-bind, in Ang's view, is to regard 
49) I am here paraphrasing Ang's description of the history of the peranakans in "On Not 
Speaking Chinese," 26-27. 
50) Ibid., 28. 
51) Ibid., 29. 
52) Ibid., 36. 
53) Ibid ., 36. 
54) See Ibid., 32-33. 
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"Chineseness" itself, and not merely citizenship, as a flexible and 
strategic identification. As Ang puts it, "if I am inescapably Chinese by 
descent, I am only sometimes Chinese by consent. When and how is a 
matter of politics."55) In this reinterpretation of the meaning of being 
part of the Chinese diaspora, Ang insists that the phenomenon of 
Chinese transnationalism can and should be understood in political 
rather than economic terms, as a form of strategic identity politics that 
remains connected and committed to spatial and temporal context. This 
can be a way of resisting the danger, as noted by Anderson and Dirlik, 
of simply ethnicizing, privatizing, and paradoxically re-nationalizing 
transnationalism. 
Another important theorization of Chinese transnational ism that is 
deeply political in content can be seen in the work of Pheng Cheah who 
is currently professor of rhetoric at UC Berkeley. Cheah' s interest lies 
in "contemporary transnationalism [that] furnishes the material 
conditions for new radical cosmopolitanisrns from below that can 
regulate the excesses of capitalist economic globalization." What he 
means by cosmopolitanism is a philosophical and political project that 
builds forms of "cultural and political solidarity and political agency" 
that are not nation-based, that mobilizes "global forms of mass-based 
political consciousness or popular feelings of belonging to a shared 
world," and "is attuned to democratic principles and human interests 
without the restriction of territorial borders."56) From this cosmopolitan 
perspective, Cheah notes, it is clear that the claim that "the 
decomposition of nation-state functions as a result of global processes 
55) Ibid., 36. 
56) Pheng Cheah, Inhuman Conditions: On Cosmopolitanism and Human Rights (Cam-
bridge, Mass .: Harvard University Press, 2006), 18-19. 
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provides a basis for the generation of cosmopolitan consciousness" is 
"premature because the partial and uneven character of globalization 
hampers the formation of mass-based global solidarity."57) In his 
analysis of Chinese transnationalism, Cheah, like Ang, emphasizes the 
fact that the "historical conflation of the overseas Chinese with 
mercantile capital" and "the culturalization of these merchants as 
self-consciously Chinese" was "a direct consequence of their subjecti-
fication through colonial 'plural society' policies."58) In other words, 
mercantile capitalism became "Chinese" "via the machinations of the 
colonial state" and not because of "a preexisting Chinese ethos that 
engenders capitalism."59) The risk in identifying Chineseness with a 
specific form of transnational capital is that it combines a colonial 
"fabulation" (using a term borrowed from Derrida, Cheah also calls it 
a "spectralization") with a fetishistic "Orientalist stereotyping," merely 
repeating the strategies of the colonial state and failing to identify that 
state as the most powerful agent of global capital. 60) The mercantile 
transnational Chinese, in other words, were a class consciously 
identified for colonial control purposes precisely in order to curb their 
political resistance. 
The re-sinicization of the overseas Chinese was, however, not only a 
colonial project but also a Chinese national project. With the passing of 
the 1909 Chinese Nationality Law that recognized the dual citizenship 
of all overseas Chinese, the Chinese nation-state stepped up the political 
effort to harness the resources of the overseas Chinese for national 
57) Ibid., 44. 
58) Ibid., 128. 
59) Ibid., 130. 
60) Ibid., 130-33. 
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purposes. This move obviously produced and encouraged national 
identifications with the Chinese state. Cheah's interesting point, 
however, is that the strengthened identifications with China sometimes 
resulted in powerful forms of anti-colonial political consciousness that 
resisted the colonial politics of divide-and-rule and rose to revolutionary 
coalitions between native resistance movements and Chinese nationalist 
activism. Cheah' s examples are the role of revolutionary Chinese 
cosmopolitanism in twentieth-century Filipino and Indonesian history.61 ) 
It is this alternate legacy of Chinese cosmopolitanism, which sometimes 
took radical political forms that engaged and interacted with 
anti-colonial national politics in important and fruitful ways, which is in 
danger of becoming lost in Cheah's view. As Cheah points out, the most 
recent forms of transnational re-sinicization originating in China 
ironically constitute "a means for China to open itself up to capitalist 
globalization with all its attendant contradictions," in contrast to the 
sinicization strategies of the early twentieth century when Chinese 
transnationals were called upon to help the Chinese state resist Western 
imperialism. 62) Chinese diasporans were perhaps never far from the 
mind of the Chinese state, which never ceased to regard them as 
long-distance nationals who would not forget the advantages of staying 
connected to their homeland. The limits of cosmopolitanism evident in 
Chinese diasporas, then, is a reminder that the celebratory models of 
Chinese transnational ism risk a political naivete, or even a political 
unconscious, that can be detrimental to the vision of any politics of 
resistance. Cheah's work thus serves as an important "cautionary 
61) I do not have the space to enlarge upon these examples here. Consult Cheah's analysis 
of the works of Filipina writer Ninotcka Rosca and Indonesian writer Promoedya 
Ananta Toer in Inhuman Conditions, 136-39. 
62) Cheah, 142. 
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antidote to the new cosmopolitanist celebration of diasporic cultures as 
harbingers of progressive change."63) 
The recent turn to China evident in the largely U.S.-based discourses 
of transnationalism, cosmopolitanism, and diaspora ultimately ironically 
proves that, whatever forms globalization takes, it is never far from the 
problems and the realities of nationalism and the nation-state that 
nonetheless continue to organize and shape the lived experience of all 
individuals. One should not forget that, at some level, Chinese 
transnational ism may be an oxymoron. The reason why the theoretic 
contributions of the diasporic Chinese intellectuals analyzed in this 
paper have struck such a strong chord in academic discourse, I believe, 
has much to do with the continuing power and dominance of western 
discourse (especially originating from U.S. universities) as well as the 
spectacular rise of China as a global power today. It is exciting to find 
that China, and East Asia in general, has become the global focal point 
for cultural theory. What we need now are more transnational and 
international voices to participate in this debate which should be 
actively deterritorialized. 
63) Ibid., 12. 
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[Abstract] 
Transnationalism, Cosmopolitanism, Diaspora: How 
China Is Changing U.S. Cultural Theory 
Eun Kyung Min 
(Seoul National University) 
As America becomes less "multicultural" and more "diasporic," its connection 
to the lands of former migrants becomes both more significant and fraught. The 
Chinese diaspora in America is a strong case in point. This paper attempts to show 
that the recent rise of three concepts of globality-namely, transnational ism, 
cosmopolitanism and diaspora-is intimately tied to the effort of diasporic 
Chinese intellectuals to theorize a "Chineseness" that is distinct from the Chinese 
nation state. The paper reviews the cultural theory of Aihwa Ong, len Ang and 
Pheng Cheah, three critics whose work is arguably changing the contours of U.S. 
cultural theory. Aihwa Ong's analysis of a new class of Chinese migrants offers a 
strong challenge to metropolitan theories of postcoloniality as well as core-
periphery models of economic development. Ong characterizes the transnational 
practices of this group of overseas Chinese as resistant to national, state-
sponsored culture, deeply strategic and pragmatic, aggressively capitalistic, 
disciplinary and patriarchal in familial practice, and flexible in choice of political 
citizenship. If Ong attends to a Chinese transnational ism that is politically and 
culturally ambiguous, Ang and Cheah are more interested in theorizing Chinese 
forms of "minor transnational ism" that are resistant to the centralizing ambitions 
of the Chinese diaspora and attuned to interventionist politics. Both Ang and 
Cheah adopt a cautionary attitude toward celebratory models of Chinese 
transnationalism and diaspora. What is certain is that the new Chinese diasporas 
of our moment complicate the traditional associations of diaspora with forced 
exile, while also retaining a distance from the celebratory notion of diaspora as 
sheer diversity and multiplicity. 
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